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I. OVERVIEW
The Clinton Administration most often receives the credit
for inspiring the heads of state in the Western Hemisphere to
agree on a two-track process that would result in a Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. That decision
was adopted formally at the Summit of the Americas (Miami
Summit or summit) meeting, held in Miami in December 1994.
All thirty-four freely-elected heads of state and government in
the Western Hemisphere signed the summit's two-part center-
piece, its Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. A recent
Canadian proposal calling for negotiations to conclude before the
end of 2004 has been well received. This deadline would allow at
least one year for countries to deposit their instruments of ratifi-
cation so as to meet the Miami 2005 deadline.
The idea of hemispheric free trade led by the United States
was not new to the Clinton Administration. President George
Bush, in an historic speech at the White House on June 27, 1990,
called for all countries in the Western Hemisphere to be "equal
partners in a free trade zone stretching from the port of Anchor-
age to the Tierra del Fuego." He announced that a free trade
agreement with Mexico, which later became the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), would be the first step in the
process toward the long-term goal of a "comprehensive free trade
zone for the Americas."
President Bill Clinton took up the free trade cause and
completed the NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. In November
1993, the U.S. Congress approved NAFTA after a considerable
legislative battle, which, among other things, bruised feelings in
Mexico over some of the more controversial aspects of the debate,
such as labor and environmental issues. Vice President Al Gore
traveled to Mexico City in the aftermath of the NAFTA victory,
and while there on December 1, 1993, made the announcement
that President Clinton would invite all democratically elected
leaders of the hemisphere to a summit meeting in the United
States during 1994.
This announcement came as a pleasant surprise to Latin
American leaders. Aside from approving NAFTA, the Clinton
Administration's foreign policy agenda had not appeared to con-
sider Latin America a high priority. Moreover, in many ways,
NAFTA could be considered primarily as domestic policy. The
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fact that trade would be the main issue at the summit was not
generally known until just weeks before the meeting. However,
the Latin American governments wanted a discussion of trade
issues from the United States as well as a clear outline of the
U.S. post-NAFTA trade agenda. When Senior Presidential Ad-
viser Thomas "Mack" McLarty took charge of the agenda-setting
process for the Administration, a strong commitment toward
hemispheric free trade finally solidified. Even as presidents and
prime ministers prepared to depart for the Miami Summit, ne-
gotiations were still in progress among all of the participants
that eventually resulted in consensus on the FTAA as a goal,
with an agreed-upon completion date of 2005.
At the three day summit, the parties were unable to agree
upon an overall blueprint or precise plan for achieving the FTAA.
However, actually reaching agreement among the thirty-four
participants to set the audacious goal of free trade and to sign
the commitment were landmark events. A timetable was set for
annual trade ministers' meetings to launch and oversee progress
on items in the Plan of Action and to advance the entire process.
Basically, this timetable of ministerial meetings has involved
setting in motion two processes, or "tracks."
Track I, involving the amalgamation and extension of
subregional free trade agreements, is progressing steadily. Two
encompassing networks of free trade agreements are emerging.
One is sponsored by the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR) and the other by Mexico. Both network
"sponsors" are bidding to have free trade agreements (FTAs)
with most of their Latin American neighbors by the end of 1997.
The Mexican-centered FTAs impose more rigorous disciplines on
national governments and are more likely to contain provisions
equivalent to NAFTA standards than are the FTAs negotiated by
MERCOSUR. If these differences could be bridged, it is possible
the two networks could be amalgamated into a single agreement
reminiscent of the Latin American Free Trade Agreement
(LAFTA) of the 1970s. However, unlike LAFTA, which never
lived up to its promise of free trade, a LAFTA II could be, both in
name and fact, a true free trade arrangement.
Policymakers at the summit believed that the United States
would participate in and help define the tenor of the Track I
process by rolling NAFTA southward, beginning with the acces-
sion of Chile. In fact, immediately following the summit, the
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presidents of the United States and Mexico and the prime minis-
ter of Canada announced that Chile would be invited to join
NAFTA. Two years later, despite the fact that economic inte-
gration within the hemisphere has moved forward with great
dispatch, U.S. participation has been confined to "careful moni-
toring" of what others are negotiating. This uncharacteristic role
for the United States stems from the absence of presidential ne-
gotiating authority for new trade agreements (known as "fast-
track"). Predictably, Chile has entered into separate bilateral
FTAs with Mexico and Canada.
While the absence of fast-track may explain why Chile has
not become NAFTA's fourth member, it does not fully explain the
United States lack of enthusiasm for NAFTA's expansion. One
reason for Washington's reticence is the public's skepticism to-
ward new trade agreements with Latin American countries.
However, even if the United States was actively seeking broader
NAFTA membership, some Latin countries, notably Brazil and
Venezuela, have stated that they are not ready to negotiate ac-
cession to NAFTA.
Thus, it is not surprising that the United States has been
aggressively pushing negotiations along Track II-the develop-
ment of hemispheric norms. So far, progress under Track II has
been quite impressive. Eleven hemispheric working groups
(HWGs), established at two ministerial meetings, have collected
sufficient data to provide the basis for hemispheric-level nego-
tiations on a comprehensive FTAA. The work of these groups is
a form of nascent negotiations, as it indirectly defines the scope
of the negotiations, as well as the basis for ultimate consensus
and general agreement. In at least one respect, the working
groups' preparatory efforts have surpassed those of the Uruguay
Round. By identifying areas of converging and diverging prac-
tices within the hemisphere, they have probably established the
parameters within which national governments will be making
ongoing trade policy decisions-well before the formal negotia-
tions are initiated. The groups are identifying: 1) modalities of
negotiations; 2) specific areas of convergence and divergence; and
3) opportunities for an "early harvest" of liberalizing measures.
At the first meeting of the Vice Ministers' caucus (which is
an outgrowth of the Track II process) since Brazil assumed the
chairmanship, the MERCOSUR and U.S. delegations began to
address the issue of a specific plan for achieving the FTAA. By
511
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the end of February 1997, Canada, the United States,
MERCOSUR, and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) had all
presented position papers regarding the start of formal FTAA
negotiations. These papers have more similarities than differ-
ences; a major point in common is that the negotiations should
be launched at the Santiago Summit in March 1998 and continue
to a conclusion consistent with the 2005 deadline.
Brazil, favoring a slower approach than that supported by
the United States, calls for three distinct stages of negotiation,
with each successive stage beginning only after the preceding
stage has been completed. The first stage would provide for an
"early harvest" limited to business facilitation issues. The sec-
ond stage would establish a set of common disciplines in a num-
ber of familiar areas. The third stage, which would probably not
begin until early next century, would address liberalized access
for goods and services, investment rule liberalization, and the
opening of government procurement to foreign bidders on an
equal basis. By moving forward in this manner, Brazil and the
other members of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay) and its related FTA network would have time to consoli-
date their arrangements before entering hemispheric negotia-
tions with the United States.
The Brazilian approach appears likely to place the United
States in the role of the principal supplicant for an FTAA, since
U.S. exports to Latin America would be at a competitive disad-
vantage relative to trade flowing under the MERCOSUR net-
work of FTAs. This assumes that NAFTA membership will not
have grown or have grown only slightly (with the possible addi-
tion of Chile and some Caribbean Basin nations) by that time.
The United States would prefer a faster negotiating schedule,
with all agenda items simultaneously under negotiation.
Until recently, FTAs received no public support in the
United States. The U.S. political establishment had not recov-
ered from the psychological effects of the Mexican peso devalua-
tion, the resulting $20 billion bailout, and the substantial trade
deficit with Mexico. There have been outbreaks of guerrilla ac-
tivity in Mexico and persistent guerrilla violence in Colombia
and Peru. Some observers have blamed the rise in guerrilla ac-
tivity on social tensions caused by excessive reliance on the "free
market" in economic policymaking and the resulting inequalities
of income distribution. The U.S. working families' declining
[Vol. 28:3
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share of national income is also blamed in part on the disruptive
effects of free trade via NAFTA. However, Mexico's early re-
payment of its debt with interest has undermined the credibility
of many anti-NAFTA groups and individuals who anticipated a
Mexican default. Mexican economic performance is expected to
continue to improve over the next few years, resulting in a con-
sequent increase in U.S. exports to Mexico and a decline in the
bilateral deficit; thus, it is likely that U.S. perceptions about
NAFTA will improve.
By failing to squarely address the popular enmity toward
free trade, the current U.S. agenda for the FTAA jeopardizes the
hemisphere's trade potential and sours many previous support-
ers of free trade on the FTAA concept. Accordingly, the Admini-
stration should promise Congress that a number of new subjects
will be added to the agenda of the FTAA, including reducing the
possibility that large changes in exchange rates would cause se-
rious swings in trade balances between FTAA participants.
The revised FTAA agenda should also include a means of
periodically determining the effects of FTA implementation on
the structure of national economies. This could help to dispel the
prevailing perception that these agreements exacerbate poverty
and income inequalities. In addition, the Administration and
Congress should develop an agenda that is more appealing to
business. At this stage, many businesspeople believe the FTAA
to be a warmed-over version of earlier negotiations. This per-
ception weakens support for the FTAA because many new issues
have emerged since the agendas were set for the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
NAFTA in the 1980s. Hemispheric trade is no longer principally
inhibited by border measures. Rather, the major problems are
caused by national regulations. The FTAA should, therefore,
address the following areas: 1) principles for deregulation; 2) im-
proving the hemispheric infrastructure for trade; 3) blending or
making more compatible the operation of the Anglo-Saxon com-
mon law system with the Roman system of Latin American coun-
tries; and 4) facilitating business at the level of a firm's
day-to-day operations.
Even if the FTAA addresses a more attractive set of issues,
there must be significant, concrete results over the next few
years. While current proposals in this regard-such as publica-
tion of a customs guide or hemisphere-wide recognition of prod-
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uct certifications by national laboratories and testing facilities-
are important, they are too technical to excite politicians, busi-
nesspeople, or the public. The types of results that would gener-
ate enthusiasm are hemisphere-wide agreements that create real
business opportunities through foreign investment liberalization,
the opening of government procurement to foreign bidders, and
making service sectors as accessible to foreign participation as
goods sectors. Since there may be no consensus on a single ap-
proach to an "early harvest" in the hemisphere, a possible way to
proceed could be by negotiating agreements that countries could
approve on an ad referendum basis. This would eliminate the
need for balanced reciprocity, which has been a problem with
previous early harvests.
If the competing objectives for the FTAA (those of U.S. do-
mestic origin and those of our hemispheric trading partners) are
to be reconciled, the U.S. Congress must enact fast-track legis-
lation-ideally, in time for the Santiago Summit of the heads of
state, to be held in Chile in March 1998.
Absent fast-track authority, the United States may not have
the credibility to achieve its preferred approach. Attention
would shift naturally to subregional integration efforts, and
hemisphere-wide talks would fade into the background. Without
fast-track negotiating authority, the role of the United States
would be limited in what could be achieved on a hemispheric
basis, possibly pared down to providing support for the expan-
sion of the Mexican network of agreements and counting on
these NAFTA-like agreements eventually to be applied to U.S.
goods and services. Ironically, although the United States may
be able to claim credit for being the catalyst for the current inte-
gration process, U.S. exporters could still find themselves on the
wrong side of the resulting preferential agreements, at least
until the FTAA becomes a reality. Fortunately, the following re-
cent Washington developments combine to indicate that the
FTAA may well become a reality with U.S. participation: Presi-
dent Clinton's renewed commitment to focus on Latin America
and hemispheric trade as expressed in his State of the Union ad-
dress; President Clinton's active travel schedule for Latin Amer-
ica, a region he did not visit during his first term; and an unex-
pectedly strong interest and reaction to the recently concluded
Canadian-Chilean FTA that may signal U.S. isolation from the
process.
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II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS: THE SUMMIT MANDATES ON
TRADE AND INTEGRATION-A Two-TRACK APPROACH
Free trade agreements have become the accepted norm
among the democratic nations of Latin America and the Carib-
bean to open their markets. There are currently two expanding
networks of free trade agreements--one involving Brazil, the
other, Mexico.
MERCOSUR, whose members are Brazil, Argentina, Para-
guay, and Uruguay, is negotiating with other South American
countries. An FTA between MERCOSUR and Chile was com-
pleted in the summer of 1996, underscoring the Brazilian ambi-
tion to create what could be termed a South American Free
Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Then in September 1996, SAFTA
moved closer to reality at the Rio Summit, when the Andean
Pact nations (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela)
agreed to enter into an FTA with MERCOSUR. The participants
are trying to complete these negotiations by the end of 1997.
So far, the agreements between MERCOSUR and its Latin
partners tackle traditional border trade barriers, such as tariffs
and some nontariff measures, but are only beginning to address
other trade-related measures, including those that impact the
services trade, investment, and intellectual property rights.
The second network of agreements is being negotiated by
Mexico. The Mexican network currently has more members than
MERCOSUR's. In addition to its NAFTA links to Canada and
the United States, Mexico has FTAs with its "Group of Three"
partners (Colombia and Venezuela), and with Bolivia, Chile, and
Costa Rica. Mexico hopes to complete FTAs with the northern
tier of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondu-
ras), and with Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Peru by the end of 1997.
Mexico's recent FTAs eliminate all border barriers and include
almost all the NAFTA-level commitments, including those cover-
ing investment and services.
Until recently, it was assumed that ideological differences,
dissimilar relationships with the United States, and national ri-
valries would preclude Mexico and Brazil from agreeing to link
MERCOSUR and Mexico through an FTA. However, on August
28, 1996, it was announced that negotiations had commenced be-
tween Mexico and MERCOSUR in the mold of MERCOSUR's ne-
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gotiations with Chile. At the outset of negotiations, the parties
would attempt to replace all expiring preferential agreements
between Mexico and each of the four MERCOSUR members (as
negotiated under the Latin American Free Trade Area-LAFTA
I) with a single agreement. The negotiations would address and
presumably extinguish compensation claims generated from the
diversionary effects of: 1) NAFTA preferences as they affect
MERCOSUR exports to Mexico; and 2) MERCOSUR preferences
as they affect Mexican exports to the four MERCOSUR mem-
bers. The target date for achieving these objectives is late 1997,
when the current, more limited bilateral agreements are sched-
uled to expire.
Doubts have been expressed about whether a Mex-
ico-MERCOSUR preferential agreement would ever move beyond
consolidation of the current, more limited agreements into a
single arrangement. Brazil might delay the second phase-
replacing limited preferences with free trade-if the possibility
of sharing its leading position in MERCOSUR with Mexico is
problematic. A second reason for Brazil to hold Mexico at arm's
length is the latter's special relationship with the United States,
including the possibility that Mexican firms would import U.S.
components duty-free, supply the labor for finishing details or
assembly or both, and ship the product into MERCOSUR coun-
tries duty-free or at reduced rates. Additionally, it may be im-
possible for Mexico and Brazil to reconcile Mexico's allegiance to
NAFTA-level obligations with Brazil's preference for less rigor-
ous obligations. Recently, however, the MERCOSUR countries
have shown an unanticipated interest in deepening the disci-
plines in their network of FTAs, thereby improving the prospect
of an agreement with Mexico.
If the MERCOSUR-Mexico negotiations were to succeed, the
two major Latin American markets would be joined in free trade.
If that hurdle were crossed, combining the Mexican and
MERCOSUR network of agreements into a single FTA would not
be too difficult, thereby creating a de facto "LAFTA II." Unlike
the original LAFTA (some called it "Laughter" since it never
went beyond the exchange of a limited number of preferences),
LAFTA II would be a comprehensive and completed free trade
area.
[Vol. 28:3
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III. LACK OF FAST-TRACK PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES
FROM JOINING PROGRESS UNDER TRACK I
The United States is unable to participate in the develop-
ment of free trade agreements under Track I because it lacks
fast-track negotiating authority. Fast-track authority allows the
president to submit free trade agreements to Congress for a
quick "up or down" vote; that is, under fast-track, members of
Congress may not amend the language of the legislation, change
U.S. implementation of the agreements as negotiated, or delay
implementation of the agreements. The U.S. trading partners
have come to expect that these procedures would be approved by
Congress before President Clinton and his trade team would en-
ter into serious negotiations. Chile, the prime candidate for
NAFTA accession, not surprisingly refused to enter into negotia-
tions with the Clinton Administration in the absence of fast-
track authority. John Biehl, Chilean Ambassador to Washing-
ton, has said that his country does not want "to have to negotiate
twice with the United States," in other words, once with Presi-
dent Clinton and then with the Congress. Thus, the United
States has been forced to place its original plan to roll NAFTA
southward on hold.
The problem in getting fast-track authority, while techni-
cally simple, has been complicated politically. After the 1994
congressional elections, the new Republican majority notified the
Administration that it wanted to give the Administration fast-
track authority, but that it had to be a "clean" fast-track, that is,
trade only-without labor and environmental components. Con-
gressional Democrats, especially House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt (who had been a determined opponent of NAFTA, re-
flecting labor objections) insisted that both labor and environ-
mental provisions at least to the NAFTA level (including the
NAFTA side agreements) would have to be integrated into any
fast-track authority for negotiations with Chile. Although com-
promise was at least theoretically possible, neither the Admini-
stration nor the two political parties were willing to take on the
issue during an election year.
However, even if fast-track authority were granted, the
United States is not expected to be able to enter into negotia-
tions with enough other hemispheric countries to rival the net-
works being created by Mexico and Brazil. In fact, the only other
1997]
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strong potential candidates for NAFTA accession are countries in
the Caribbean Basin. The degree of U.S. business penetration of
the Caribbean, the small size of the economies, and the fact that
they are considered within the sphere of U.S. strategic interests
improve their prospects. Further, the Administration has com-
mitted to Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) leaders to use legis-
lation to prevent harm to the CBI's major nontraditional export
to the United States-namely, apparel. The Caribbean Basin
apparel industry, as well as U.S. apparel producers (who now
rely on coproduction with the region to maintain their competi-
tiveness against Far Eastern imports) are both currently under
pressure because of the more preferential access offered the
same products entering the United States from Mexico under
NAFTA. If the Administration does not honor its commitment to
the CBI countries, it will lose credibility not only throughout the
Caribbean, but also with other smaller economies in Latin
America that are considering the opportunities offered by
NAFTA membership and, eventually, the FTAA.
While there is support for joining the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries to NAFTA, no political consensus exists. Many of the CBI
beneficiaries do not meet informal U.S. prerequisites for NAFTA
membership. A 1992 study by Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey
J. Schott identified seven criteria for judging whether a country
is "ready" for NAFTA: price stability, budget discipline, accept-
able management of external debt, currency stability, mar-
ket-oriented policies, a tax structure not unduly reliant on duty
revenues; and a functioning democracy.1 Chile met the criteria
easily. The only CBI beneficiaries to be on or close to par with
Chile were particular Caribbean states (the Bahamas, Barbados,
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) and El Salvador. At this
time, Congress strongly opposes favoring any Central American
country (except Costa Rica) with any new concessions due to con-
cerns about the strength of their democratic institutions and al-
leged inadequate protection of labor rights. Additionally, critics
of Mexico's low-wage assembly industries (maquiladoras) will
find that many CBI countries depend on the same type of indus-
trial development strategies as those used in Mexico.
1. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992).
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This situation may be changing. Hufbauer and Schott have
updated the "readiness ratings" in a new edition of their book.
They show that democratization in Central America has pro-
gressed significantly. Political changes in El Salvador and Gua-
temala support arguments for their participation in free trade
agreements. President Clinton's May 1997 trip to Mexico, Costa
Rica, and Barbados provided an opportunity for Central Ameri-
can countries to commit to free trade negotiations both in the
context of NAFTA accession and FTAA completion. Such a
commitment eventually could allow for Central America's en-
hanced access to the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. markets on a
temporary basis while full-scale negotiations are underway.
The immediate political situation does not bode well for
NAFTA expansion in Latin America beyond Chile and, perhaps,
the CBI countries. Venezuela has not indicated a desire for
membership, and its current economic situation, although im-
proving, makes quick NAFTA accession problematic. The drug
trafficking problem makes consideration of an FTA with Colom-
bia impossible for now, although the country is on record as fa-
voring NAFTA entry. Insufficient information exists to refute
the following impressions about the other Andean Pact members
(Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru); these countries are characterized
by widespread poverty, unstable democracies, and uncontrolled
trade in illegal drugs. These perceptions preclude the possibility
of a serious consideration of an FTA relationship at this time.
MERCOSUR's leaders are too preoccupied with the further
development of their own integration plan, as well as their rela-
tionships with other Latin American countries, to consider
NAFTA membership at this time. More importantly, the
MERCOSUR countries do not believe that their private sectors
are ready to compete with U.S. multinationals on a level playing
field. The United States, for its part, has not begun the public
education process necessary to sell a NAFTA-MERCOSUR or
NAFTA-SAFTA agreement to a Republican-controlled Congress.
Another consideration is that the MERCOSUR integration model
is much more limited in scope than the NAFTA model, and there
is no indication that the differences in levels of obligation could
be brought into harmony through negotiation, especially if the
negotiation process is constrained by time pressures.
However, it is worth noting that the Clinton Administration
appears to be targeting Brazil as the hemispheric country with
519
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which it would most like to expand relations. Brazilian Presi-
dent Fernando Henrique Cardoso has characterized
U.S.-Brazilian relations as being in the best shape they have
been for decades. President Clinton plans to visit Brazil in the
fall of 1997. While the chances for a turnaround on trade issues
may not be great, the presidents' meeting may lead to a change
of perspective in both countries and a commitment to reach an
agreement if and when fast-track is renewed, were such an
agreement to be authorized by Congress.
IV. THE HEMISPHERIC ALTERNATIVE: WORKING GROUPS
SERVE AS POINT OF Focus
It is not surprising that the United States has been empha-
sizing the preparatory phase of negotiations under Track II-the
development of hemispheric norms. Twelve HWGs serve as the
focal point of the FTAA process. Seven groups were created at
the Denver Trade Ministerial meeting, in June 1995: 1) Market
Access; 2) Customs Procedures and Rules of Origin; 3) Invest-
ment; 4) Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade; 5) Sanitary
and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures; 6) Subsidies, Antidumping
and Countervailing Duties; and 7) Smaller Economies.
Four additional HWGs were established at a subsequent
meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, in March 1996: 8) Government
Procurement; 9) Intellectual Property Rights; 10) Services; and
11) Competition Policy. A twelfth group, Dispute Settlement,
was established at the Trade Ministerial meeting in Belo Hori-
zonte, Brazil, in May 1997.
Five of the six HWGs established in Denver have made sub-
stantial progress in developing the foundations for negotiations.
The sixth group, which deals specifically with agricultural sub-
sidies and trade remedies, is very controversial largely due to the
U.S. Congress absolute resistance to consideration of modifica-
tions in these areas. The seventh group, on Smaller Economies,
has received high marks for its analysis of the problems facing
the Caribbean and Central American mini states, but the group
is not considered a forerunner of a negotiating group. Its find-
ings, however, will be taken into consideration in overall FTAA
negotiations.
The four groups established in Cartagena are generally con-
sidered to be tackling more controversial topics than those un-
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dertaken by the Denver-created groups; however, it is too early
to know whether their initial work programs will proceed
smoothly.
The HWGs are supported by a host of multilateral and pluri-
lateral organizations. Major backup is being provided by the
Trade Unit of the Organization of American States (OAS), the
Integration and Regional Programs Department of the In-
ter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the staffs of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). Together, these three organizations, re-
ferred to as the Tripartite Committee, are providing support.
Also providing assistance are the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), the World Bank's International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, the Latin American Economic
System (Sistema Econmico Latinoamericano), the Latin Ameri-
can Integration Association (Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de In-
tegraci6n), the Pan American Commission for Technical Stan-
dards (Comisi6n Panamericana de Normas Tgcnicas), the World
Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Customs Or-
ganization.
Although each HWG has a distinct work program, a number
of tasks are held in common by all of the HWGs: 1) preparation
of compendia of measures, databases, and other materials to be
used during negotiations; 2) identification of where hemispheric
practices converge and diverge; 3) suggestions on how to negoti-
ate in their respective areas; 4) identification of possibilities for
immediate action; and 5) advice on private sector involvement.
A. Preparing Compendia
The first task-preparing compendia of measures, data, and
other materials to be used during negotiations-is proceeding ex-
tremely well. With the exception of the group on Smaller
Economies, which has a more analytical agenda, each working
group is collecting three types of data and information. The
groups are establishing: 1) inventories or compendia of national
measures; 2) compendia of provisions in agreements entered into
by hemispheric countries; and 3) databases of hemispheric trade
and investment flows. In addition, a number of the groups are
preparing their own analyses of WTO rules.
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Thanks to the drive of a number of working group chairper-
sons and the assistance of the Tripartite Committee (OAS, IDB,
and ECLAC), many of the seven Denver-created groups have
gathered the critical information and data necessary for govern-
ment-to-government negotiations to take place. More compre-
hensive and sophisticated preparatory materials are now avail-
able than were given to the negotiators during the Uruguay
Round. In this respect, the HWGs have certainly outdone their
counterparts in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
(APEC).
The largest share of the credit for preparing these materials
should go to the OAS and the IDB, both of which devoted large
quantities of internal resources to these efforts. The IDB to-
gether with UNCTAD has developed sophisticated software for
collecting data. The resulting trade database contains informa-
tion on preferential duties, tariff rate quotas, SPS measures, and
technical standards for every product traded in the hemisphere.
This data should allow a more comprehensive approach to mar-
ket access than in other negotiations.
The OAS has been working in the very controversial area of
agricultural subsidies and unfair trade remedies. In order to as-
sure that the database was put together on a timely basis, the
OAS collected and organized descriptions of unfair trade remedy
laws in effect in each of the FTAA countries. The OAS also de-
veloped an historical record of proposals offered in the Uruguay
Round's agricultural working group. Although the United States
and Brazil objected to the gathering of information not requested
by the negotiating countries, the OAS study has been accepted.
The third member of the Tripartite Committee, ECIAC, has
taken the lead in support of the more recently formed HWG on
Services. Given the number of sectors to be covered by this
group, the amount of support work should not be underesti-
mated.
B. Identifying Convergence and Divergence
The second task of the groups is to identify where hemi-
spheric practices converge and diverge. If there is to be a hemi-
spheric paradigm in key areas of trade, investment, and general
commerce, at the outset of negotiations the negotiators need to
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have an understanding of how national policies are converging
and how they may be diverging. By assembling this information,
the groups are attempting to design the FTAA negotiations to
assure that after an appropriate phase-in period, all the coun-
tries will be following common or at least equivalent practices in
trade and trade-related areas. The negotiations will need to fo-
cus on preventing backsliding where practices are already con-
verging and closing gaps where they are diverging.
In addition to establishing a basis for negotiations, the sig-
nificance of this work is two-fold. First, after these studies are
completed, countries can compare their policies and regulations
to those of their hemispheric partners. Second, they can con-
sider this information when updating their own laws or negotiat-
ing provisions for inclusion in subregional agreements. There-
fore, the very existence of HWG studies that respond to this
mandate will facilitate the harmonization of practices prior to
the negotiations.
The HWGs have also been asked to recommend how nego-
tiations should be organized in their respective areas. This
question was being addressed in each HWG and by the Vice
Ministers' caucus between January 1997 and the Belo Horizonte
Ministerial on May 16, 1997. At that meeting, the ministers in-
structed the HWGs to continue their tasks according to their
agreed terms of reference. They should also submit different
technical alternatives on possible issues and negotiating ap-
proaches to the next Vice Ministers meeting prior to the next
trade ministerial in San Jos6, in February 1998.
Two working groups have begun to address how to construct
the FTAA. The HWG on Market Access asked the secretariats of
subregional groupings to explain how free trade was negotiated,
with the intent of providing guidance to FTAA negotiators. The
HWG on Smaller Economies, although waiting for specific rec-
ommendations from the functionally oriented working groups,
appears to agree that it will focus its recommendations on tech-
nical assistance and temporary aid, as opposed to permanent
derogations from specific FTAA obligations.
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C. Negotiating Modalities
The third task-defining negotiating modalities-is largely
derivative of the work being carried out under the first two man-
dates. The development of issue-specific compendia defines the
subject of negotiations. It will be difficult to negotiate on an is-
sue not included in the compendia. Provisions included in
agreements to which FTAA participants belong provide models
for the hemispheric FTAA. Uruguay Round accomplishments
are interpreted by each HWG and may be used to establish the
starting point for the negotiations.
Studies showing which trade practices are pervasive in the
hemisphere and which regulatory practices differ among coun-
tries will define the eventual negotiating agenda. Where prac-
tices converge and meet world-class standards, negotiations will
focus on codification and assuring that no backsliding occurs.
D. Identifying Immediate Actions
As the FTAA negotiations are not foreseen to end before the
year 2005, there is general consensus that there should be some
intermediate, concrete results under Track II. Without such re-
sults, the negotiations may quickly become irrelevant to politi-
cians (who may be out of office before the negotiations conclude)
as well as to the private sector.
Unfortunately, the business facilitation topics mentioned in
the Cartagena Declaration and in the Brazilian proposal at Flo-
rianopolis lend themselves to a number of relatively modest
steps. These include: 1) publication of a guide to national cus-
toms documentation requirements and recommendations for
promoting electronic filing of documents; 2) release of an inven-
tory of investment agreements and treaties and of a compendium
of hemispheric trade laws and procedures; 3) dissemination of a
market access database; 4) agreement on a common form for
certification of origin; 5) making recommendations on measures,
including technical assistance, to facilitate the integration of
smaller economies into the FTAA; 6) public exhortations for
countries to join existing arbitral conventions for state-investor
disputes; 7) improvements in transportation; and 8) development
of procedures for Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs).
MRAs recognize foreign laboratories' and testing facilities' com-
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petence to certify that products meet the agricultural SPS stan-
dards or industrial technical requirements of importing countries
that sign the MRA.
Although these measures may have some commercial sig-
nificance, they are relatively modest. However, the reaping of a
more substantive early harvest seems particularly difficult. As
happened in the Uruguay Round, in which the early harvest was
largely unsuccessful, impediments to this process are as follow:
Negotiations in the separate working groups are closely in-
tertwined. Thus, it is difficult to envision circumstances in
which one group produces even an "intermediate" agreement
without similar results from other groups.
Individual countries may not wish to make concessions un-
less they receive satisfaction from other countries. It is very dif-
ficult to develop this parity among countries before a negotiation
is completed, especially if even one of the participating countries
does not want to give concessions until the final bargaining ses-
sion.
WTO rules only allow for preferential treatment in the con-
text of a completed free trade agreement. Since interim results
cannot be applied preferentially, all concessions must be applied
on a most favored nation (MFN) basis. There is legitimate con-
cern about giving away significant concessions to nonpartici-
pants in Europe and Asia.
E. Advising on Private Sector Role
The role of the priv&t.e sector still appears to be within the
purview of the negotiations. Governments have talked publicly
about the importance of private sector participation, but so far
no consensus has been reached on the method for allowing full
private sector participation.
The Third Americas Business Forum was held simultane-
ously with the Belo Horizonte Ministerial; national private sec-
tor leaders had opportunities to exchange views with trade min-
isters. The Brazilian organizers called for any written recom-
mendations or papers from the private sector to be submitted by
March 15, 1997, well in advance of the forum. This allowed sub-




The Business Network for Hemispheric Integration (BNHI),
a grouping of about seventy regional, subregional, and national
private sector organizations, held two general assemblies in 1996
and a third one in January 1997. The members of the Tripartite
Committee have been instructed to make available to the private
sector their studies and compendia after they are completed and
approved. The OAS issued the compendia of investment meas-
ures recently.
National governments have been urged to consult with their
private sectors. This will, of course, operate more efficiently in
some countries than in others. As discussed further in the Ap-
pendix to this paper, more work needs to be done before the next
Ministerial at San Jos6 on the appropriate role for the private
sector. Other than agreeing to distribute approved materials
and to hold a limited number of briefings for the private sector,
the working groups have yet to address this subject substan-
tively.
We suggest that a specific role be provided for the private
sector at the hemispheric level. This role can be expanded as the
process moves forward and as the national private sectors dem-
onstrate their willingness to devote sufficient resources to organ-
ize themselves at the hemispheric level. Designated private sec-
tor groups should be responsible for collecting and fully
disseminating information on developments in the process. The
official HWGs should meet regularly with private sector repre-
sentatives. Private sector groups should also be asked to report
on how to mobilize popular support for the FTAA. The BNHI
could play such a coordinating role.
V. COMPETING MODELS LEAVE PATH TO FTAA UNCLEAR
On January 23, 1997, Canada presented a proposal for
building the FTAA, stipulating the launching of negotiations at
the Santiago Summit in March 1998, aiming to conclude nego-
tiations no later than December 31, 2003, "so as to provide signa-
tories sufficient time to carry out domestic steps to ratify and
implement the Agreement by January 1, 2005." It proposed that
the FTAA be a single agreement; nevertheless, it should co-exist
with, not replace, subregional agreements like NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, and other bilateral and plurilateral trade agree-
ments.
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In February 1997, the United States, through its embassies
in the region, passed a position paper to governments on FTAA
negotiations. The U.S. paper and the Canadian paper are in
broad agreement, especially in taking the stance that basic mar-
ket access elements and basic rules should be items of first con-
centration. There are some differences on the timing of negotiat-
ing certain areas, but these are not fundamental differences. A
CARICOM proposal, similar to the U.S. and Canadian proposals,
calling for market access talks in early 1998 has also been made.
In contrast, an updated MERCOSUR proposal in late Feb-
ruary 1997 reiterates that group's earlier position that the con-
struction of the FTAA should take place in three stages which,
"start[s] with business facilitation measures, moving onto an in-
termediate phase where topics not related to market access and
corresponding disciplines would be dealt with," and reserving
"substantive" negotiations, including market access for goods
and services for the third phase, occurring between 2003-2005.
The MERCOSUR document was presented at the Vice-Ministers'
trade meeting at Recife, held February 25-27, 1997.
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the similarities
among the papers are more significant than their differences. It
is noteworthy, for instance, that they all specify that FTAA ne-
gotiations should be launched at the Santiago Summit in March
1998 and continue without any formal or informal suspensions to
a conclusion consistent with the 2005 deadline. They also agree
that the FTAA working groups will be transformed into negotiat-
ing groups. With some differences, they also recognize the need
for a secretariat function to be performed, the logical candidate
being the Tripartite Committee.
In all these proposals, it is likewise recognized that the
starting point would be the Uruguay Round commitments. The
FTAA would be a single agreement that is a stand-alone ar-
rangement, which would not subsume existing integration
agreements such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR. In fact, all of these
points of similarity were formally endorsed by the trade minis-
ters at Belo Horizonte last May.
The divergences in the proposals reflect the competing
Brazilian and U.S. views of FTAA construction which have been
present all along. At the first meeting of the Vice Ministers' cau-
cus since Brazil assumed the chairmanship, the MERCOSUR
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and U.S. delegations began to address the issue of a negotiating
plan for achieving the FTAA. Brazil, whose government is not
constrained by the lack of negotiating authority, offered a spe-
cific, if incomplete, plan for completing negotiations by the year
2005.
The MERCOSUR proposal addressed the timing of the ne-
gotiations and the order in which issues should be addressed: a
three-stage negotiation, with each successive stage beginning
only after the preceding stage is completed.
Under the MERCOSUR proposal, the first stage principally
should yield business facilitation measures that lower the costs
associated with transportation and border clearance. During the
second stage, the negotiations would address subjects usually
associated with international codes of conduct, for example,
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary require-
ments, treatment of foreign investment and investors, and intel-
lectual property. Only in the third and last stage would the ne-
gotiations address liberalization of goods and services barriers
and the more controversial topic of government procurement.
MERCOSUR's proposals reflect Brazil's domestic policies
toward business modernization. Brazil is currently implement-
ing programs to reduce production costs. Concrete measures
that lower administrative costs for Brazilian exporters would
complement these programs.
Postponing product-specific liberalization until a third ne-
gotiating stage means that such negotiations would probably not
begin until the next century. This would allow Brazil time to
reinforce its position within a South American or a Latin Ameri-
can negotiating bloc and postpone the elimination of the prefer-
ences that MERCOSUR products will enjoy through its network
of FTAs. Depending on how MERCOSUR's negotiations with the
European Union (EU) proceed, Brazil might find it advantageous
to offer the EU short-term preferences, thereby increasing the
negotiating value of Brazilian concessions in the FTAA process.
The Brazilian proposal does not discuss the forum in which
the negotiations will take place. It leaves open the question of
whether the negotiations will take place at the hemispheric level
or be held on an ad hoc basis among the subregional groups.
Brazil appears to prefer to conduct the most serious negotiations
among participants in subregional integration agreements. Ac-
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cordingly, Brazil may recommend that the work of the HWGs be
circulated periodically to various subregional groups for their in-
formation and reference. The subregional groups would then
utilize those materials to deepen their current arrangements and
to negotiate with other subregional groups.
The United States would prefer a faster negotiating sched-
ule, with all agenda items under negotiation simultaneously, ac-
cording to modalities modeled after those in the Uruguay Round.
The HWGs would be transformed into negotiating groups, ad-
dressing their respective issues. Eventually, matters that could
not be settled within the HWGs would be negotiated at a higher
level.
Close to the heart of the differences between the Brazilian
and U.S. approaches to the actual negotiating scenario lies the
issue of "depth of commitments." There is general accord that
the WTO agreements now in place will serve as the lowest com-
mon denominator in establishing the content of FTAA disci-
plines. Moreover, every FTAA participant has at least one spe-
cific WTO agreement that it would be happy to see strengthened
in the course of the FTAA negotiations. Beyond these generali-
ties lies the natural division between nations on the lower end of
the development scale and the more advanced economies whose
export sectors are competitively strong and diversified. The
NAFTA members as a group want more additions to more WTO
agreements than do the MERCOSUR nations. The positions of
the Caribbean, Central American, and Andean governments
straddle those of the two network "sponsors." These divisions
are best understood at the level of specific negotiating issues dis-
cussed below.
A. Market Access
There is no question that in the important area of market
access, negotiations will surpass MFN liberalization resulting
from the Uruguay Round. Free trade involves zero duties on
substantially all trade. However, with the precedents estab-
lished in the Uruguay Round for zero-for-zero duty reductions on
a sectoral basis, which will be extended through the forthcoming
Information Technology Agreement, it appears likely that in




Two factors will determine the extent to which the FTAA
will surpass MFN reductions: 1) Whether there is additional
MFN liberalization beyond that agreed to in the Round;2 and
2) Whether the FTAA, like NAFTA, eliminates duties immedi-
ately on a high percentage of heavily traded products and phases
out all duties on the remainder. So far, MERCOSUR's agree-
ments have provided for considerably fewer instances of tariff
elimination and have not established a schedule for eliminating
duties on the remainder of the items.
B. Investment
There is a consensus that the FTAA will go beyond current
WTO investment rules. The WTO only addresses trade-related
performance requirements applied to foreign investments. At
the recent WTO Ministerial meeting, Brazil and other Latin
American countries indicated their willingness to explore the
possibility of deepening these provisions. Developing countries
in Asia and Africa opposed even a preliminary review. Brazil
has a number of separate investment agreements with its FTA
partners. Brazil has supported activities in the HWG on in-
vestment to identify areas where national regimes converge and
diverge and has indicated a willingness to develop a hemispheric
regime on investment, including protection of foreign investors.
Brazil is still suggesting that any discussion on investment lib-
eralization be delayed until the end of the process.
The United States is expected to join Canada, Mexico, and
other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries to conclude the wide-ranging Multilateral
Agreement on Investment by the middle of 1997 in the OECD.
This agreement could provide a model for the FTAA negotia-
tions.
2. For example, agreements negotiated at the Singapore Ministerial have set the
stage for eliminating duties on about ninety percent of world MFN trade in information
technology items, as well as on a number of pharmaceutical products not formerly cov-
ered by zero-for-zero agreements.
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C. Customs Procedures, SPS, and Technical
Barriers to Trade
The third area in which participants have indicated a con-
sensus to go beyond the Uruguay Round is in facilitative areas
implementing a number of the codes. The following package of
items has been agreed upon as the starting point for FTAA ne-
gotiations: the acceptance, implementation, and, where neces-
sary, provision of technical assistance to enable compliance with
WTO codes on customs procedures, SPS standards, and indus-
trial standards. FTAA negotiations will focus on developing
common customs procedures to facilitate trade. There will also
be work on a hemisphere-wide recognition of certification and
testing results of national laboratories, and, where possible,
harmonization or recognition of equivalent standards.
Similar efforts are underway in other regional groupings.
The EU and the United States are focusing on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade agreements in specific sectors. APEC has business
facilitation groups working in these sectors. Customs harmoni-
zation is an objective of the World Customs Organization. Al-
though we see some multilateral progress here, there are greater
opportunities for progress within the FTAA and other regional
forums.
D. Services
Whether one will go beyond the WTO rules in liberalizing
trade in services is not yet decided. The United States and
Mexico would prefer that services be completely liberalized as
under NAFTA, with the possibility of a limited number of per-
manent exceptions. Brazil has yet to indicate whether it prefers
liberalization to proceed under the FTAA or in the context of the
next round of WTO Services negotiations to begin in the year
2000.
E. Government Procurement
The United States would certainly prefer that government
procurement be opened without regard to nationality and that
provisions in NAFTA or the plurilateral agreement in the WTO
be applied in the FTAA. No Latin American country is a mem-
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ber of the plurilateral WTO agreement. Brazil has indicated its
wariness of moving too quickly in this area, preferring that prog-
ress be made under the WTO first. Brazil has suggested that
negotiations on this topic be postponed until the final phase.
F. Agricultural Subsidies
All countries except the United States would like to see agri-
cultural subsides on hemispheric trade eliminated under the
FTAA. The United States prefers to consider any prohibition of
agricultural subsidies only in the context of the WTO and its ag-
ricultural negotiations, scheduled to begin in 1999. Argentina
has led efforts to outlaw agricultural subsidies in hemispheric
trade except when subsidies are used to counteract third-country
practices.
G. Trade Remedies and Competition Policy
The United States is isolated in its attempt to prevent any
serious discussion of dumping laws in the FTAA context. The
United States successfully avoided undertaking any commitment
to modify its practices in the dumping and countervailing duty
areas in NAFTA, with the exception of adopting a dispute set-
tlement mechanism. The United States may not agree to the
dispute settlement mechanism in the FTAA. In the group on
competition, the United States would prefer that preliminary
work focus on eliminating cartels and other anticompetitive
practices that prevent the penetration of U.S. products, services,
and investment.
All the other FTAA-participating countries favor doing away
with national antidumping remedies against hemispheric im-
ports. Instead, they prefer to rely on competition policy, which
does not differentiate between imports and domestically pro-
duced products on analysis of unfair practices. In a number of
subregional FTAs (most recently, the Canadian-Chilean FTA),
antidumping cases against member countries are prohibited.
Thus, for trade remedies, these countries would prefer to go be-
yond the Uruguay Round and to use some of the subregional
FTAs as a model rather than NAFTA.
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H. Dispute Settlement
Finally, there could be significant differences among the
participants over dispute settlement. A dispute settlement
group was established at the Belo Horizonte Ministerial. The
United States would prefer an extremely legalistic body modeled
on dispute settlement in the WTO and in NAFTA. Brazil, on the
other hand, may prefer a more flexible settlement process, whose
institutional framework focuses more on consultation and nego-
tiation than on imposition of rulings. The terms of reference set
at the Ministerial charged the new HWG with compiling proce-
dures and mechanisms included in present Western Hemisphere
agreements and the WTO, to identify areas of commonality and
divergence, and to make specific recommendations with respect
to the FTAA.
VI. NEW ISSUES FOR NEGOTIATION
One of the most glaring problems with the FTAA agenda is
that it does not address post-Uruguay Round, post-NAFTA trade
issues. The FTAA issues currently listed were originally identi-
fied in the 1980s, which, in trade policy terms, makes them an-
cient. As the impact of globalization has accelerated in the
1990s, new issues have become apparent but have not been in-
cluded in the process. This is especially true in the aftermath of
the NAFTA debate, during which questions were raised about
the effects of major currency realignments within a free trade
context and about the issue of persistent wage suppression in
one or more of the FTA member countries. Business interests
have identified new issues that need to be addressed, such as ex-
cessive national regulations that hinder the ability of businesses
to operate in a global environment.
The inclusion of new issues in the FTAA process is particu-
larly critical to the success of fast-track in the 105th Congress,
as both the business and labor constituencies must be convinced
that the FTAA process will encompass their respective millen-




A. Linking Trade Liberalization to Alleviate
Poverty and Income Inequality
A new approach to the question of linking trade liberaliza-
tion to social issues appears necessary. The recent WTO Minis-
terial in Singapore probably quelled any multilateral considera-
tion of workers' rights in a trade discipline context. So far, most
countries have resisted the introduction of this issue in the
FTAA process. No working group has been established to ex-
plore it. However, it is hard to envision a Democratic U.S. presi-
dent who would agree to move forward on free trade without
some type of social issue being placed on the agenda. Moreover,
Brazil, with its own strong labor movement, also has indicated a
desire to explore this issue.
An acceptable alternative to the emotionally charged issue of
workers' rights would be to interpret free trade agreements in
relation to their success in alleviating poverty and income ine-
quality. Countries would be urged to adopt policies to secure so-
cial goals. However, decisions would be left to the countries
themselves, as such policies are clearly within the purview of
national sovereignty. This formulation would allow labor rights
to be considered as part of the free trade initiative but would not
raise the specter of trade restrictions being used to address al-
leged violations of labor rights. It would, on the other hand,
squarely confront two concerns: 1) a perception that free trade
actually aggravates income inequality and poverty in member
countries; and 2) the claim that economic dislocations caused by
NAFTA fell disproportionately on workers and the disadvan-
taged within society. The formulation would also be attractive
because it would help developing countries to become more at-
tuned to the concept of macroeconomic coordination.
An FTAA working group addressing an "incomes policy" is-
sue could develop empirical evidence on the effects of free trade
on all elements of society. The group could also explore ways to
alleviate social tensions caused by economic reforms. It would
only identify ways that national governments could assure citi-
zens that the gains from free trade were divided fairly and that
there were sufficient resources for the government to meet the
challenges of any dislocations. The group would limit itself to
studies, as to go beyond that would certainly impinge on sover-
eignty. National governments would decide for themselves how
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to use the conclusions. The work of this group could be linked to
work being carried out by the hemisphere's labor ministers.
B. The Trade-Monetary Linkage
Public opinion in all countries seems to hold that for free
trade to work, the issue of the effects of monetary fluctuations on
competitive advantage must be addressed. In the past three
years, Brazilian, Colombian, and U.S. producers have been
harmed by devaluations by their FTA partners: Argentina,
Venezuela, and Mexico, respectively. In fact, U.S. public opinion
is still wary about free trade due to the coincidence in timing
among NAFTA implementation, the fall in the peso's value, the
resulting bailout, and the subsequent trade deficit.
There is insufficient convergence in macroeconomic policy in
the hemisphere to allow for formal linkage of monetary and ex-
change rate policy among members of a free trade agreement.
However, the free exchange of goods among countries in an FTA
calls for some form of regular consultations and exchanges of in-
formation among countries in an FTA.
While mandatory requirements, such as those included in
the Maastricht Treaty for European Monetary Union, would not
be appropriate for the FTAA, a system of nonbinding indicators
for setting off consultations would be useful. The indicators can
be modeled after those in Maastricht and include such variables
as the ratio of governmental budget deficits to GNP, government
debt as a percentage of GNP, and relative fluctuations in ex-
change and inflationary rates.
Interestingly, opposition to including the subject of monetary
and exchange rate policy linkage in the FTAA has not come from
either the private sector or trade and commerce ministers, but
from Finance Ministry officials, who claim that it is not an ap-
propriate subject for free trade negotiations. These officials fear
that opening this issue will allow their terrain to be invaded by
nonfinance officials; however, not addressing it would encourage
stronger opposition to extending free trade. A possible way to
overcome bureaucratic opposition would be a joint working group
involving finance ministers and trade ministers.
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C. Deregulation and Rule-Making
The newest issue in trade negotiations may be deregulation.
As production and investments become globalized, it is increas-
ingly difficult and wasteful of resources for companies to adjust
to different national rules and regulations. Although it is un-
realistic to expect countries to give up their own system of
rule-making, it is possible to agree on some common principles.
Perhaps modeled after current rules on SPS and industrial stan-
dards-setting, there could be an agreement that regulations
should be as minimally disruptive to market decisions as possi-
ble, consistent with their social purposes. There should also be
full transparency in the rule-making process.
D. Development of Hemisphere- Wide Infrastructure
to Assure that the Advantages of Free Trade can
be Realized
This agenda item can address how to develop national infra-
structure in ways that encourage the flow of goods and services
throughout the hemisphere. One could also work with Finance
Ministry officials in some form of a joint working group to assure
that official and private sector forms of financing are available.
E. Melding the Operation of the Anglo-Saxon
Common Law System with the More Roman
System of Latin American Countries
It has become clear that a full-scale legal review must be
carried out to decide how best to meld or coordinate the legal
traditions of the United States and the English-speaking Carib-
bean with the different civil law traditions of Latin America.
This issue is already under discussion in national bar associa-
tions.
F. Trade Facilitation
There is no better way to maintain interest in the FTAA
process than to borrow a leaf from the APEC experience. In ad-
dition to trade liberalizing groups, APEC has thirteen groups
pursuing economic and technological cooperation as a way to en-
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courage increased investment and trade among the members.
These groups are considering joint activities for: 1) human re-
source development; 2) science and technology; 3) small and
medium enterprises; 4) economic infrastructure; 5) energy; 6)
transportation; 7) telecommunication and information; 8) tour-
ism; 9) trade and investment data; 10) trade promotion; 11) ma-
rine resource conservation; 12) fisheries; and 13) agricultural
technology. Similar groups set up under the FTAA rubric could
provide the concrete results that actually generate business and
employment.
VII. POLITICAL SUPPORT WILL CLEAR A PATH TO AGREEMENT
If competing objectives for the FTAA, both domestically and
among our hemispheric trading partners, are to be resolved suc-
cessfully, the U.S. Congress must enact fast-track legislation-
ideally, in time for the Santiago Summit.
Until now, the United States has been able to lead the FTAA
process through the establishment and operation of HWGs.
With the issue of the U.S. presidency settled, fast-track is crucial
to the continued credibility of this approach. The rest of the
hemisphere is in the process of exchanging trade concessions,
and if the United States were not able to participate, it would be
relegated to the role of observer with the possible exception of
providing support to Mexican efforts to establish high standards.
The process of creating NAFTA-level hemispheric norms would
be side-tracked and soon forgotten.
The Clinton Administration's successful progress toward an
FTAA will depend on the strength of its legislative agenda early
in the second term, the willingness of the White House to use
sufficient political capital to gain approval of the legislation, and
a willingness by both the Congress and the Administration to
compromise on the thorny issue of linking trade liberalization
with international workers' rights. President Clinton's en-
dorsement of fast-track and negotiations with Latin America in
his 1997 State of the Union address is a positive sign.
In an attempt to spur congressional action, the Administra-
tion has appointed Senior Presidential Adviser Mack McLarty as
special envoy for relations with the Western Hemisphere. The
Administration has set in motion a series of action-forcing events
to increase pressure on Congress to enact fast-track. This plan,
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coordinated by McLarty, started with Chilean President Eduardo
Frei's visit to Washington early in February 1997, followed by
the president's two Latin American trips. At present, the Ad-
ministration plans to submit fast track legislation in September,
1997.
McLarty's appointment has given considerable hope to advo-
cates of hemispheric integration who have interpreted lack of
fast-track authority as evidence of a new era of "benign neglect"
by the United States in the hemisphere. The U.S. business
community in Latin America and the Caribbean can be seen as
his principal constituency. McClarty is politically realistic; he
surely appreciates the difficulty of building a free trade constitu-
ency in the U.S. Congress. At the same time, he is familiar with
the president's persuasive powers: if President Clinton becomes
energized about the issue, he can exert sustained leadership in
the Congress and in the larger forum of public opinion.
The Administration must develop an agenda that responds
to some of the widely held misgivings about FTAs while mobiliz-
ing private sector support. Fortunately, there is sufficient time
between now and the year 2005 to work on these issues and find
solutions that may well overcome stubborn political obstacles.
Lacking fast-track authority, however, the United States
may not have the credibility to achieve its preferred approach in
the short term. This could result in all attention shifting to
subregional integration efforts. Hemisphere-wide talks could
quickly lose momentum. The role of the United States would be
limited to providing support for the expansion of the Mexican
network of agreements, in the hope that these NAFTA-like
agreements eventually would be applied to U.S. goods and serv-
ices. Ironically, although the United States may be able to claim
credit for serving as the catalyst for the current integration proc-
ess, U.S. exporters could still find themselves on the wrong side
of the resulting preferential agreements, at least until the FTAA
becomes a reality. These issues make 1997 a crucial year for
hemispheric free trade. While initial indications are positive,
they are not determinative.
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VIII. APPENDIX: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE FTAA
PROCESS
The private sector has been more involved in the FTAA
process than in other trade negotiations. Due to the leadership
of the late U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and the Chair-
man of the Cartagena Americas Business Forum, Jorge Ramirez
Ocampo, representatives of the hemispheric private sector have
met in conjunction with the first two Trade Ministerial meetings.
Their views have been presented to the ministers and circulated
to the working groups.
At Belo Horizonte, the Brazilian private sector organized the
largest Americas Business Forum held to date. Discussions in
the working groups were relevant to issues being considered by
the ministers and allowed as much interaction between govern-
ment officials and private sector officials as possible. This forum
stressed closer integration of the private sector, both at the na-
tional and hemispheric level.
The Trade Unit of the OAS has been in the forefront in cre-
ating a web page and providing periodic reports on progress in
the working groups. The Trade Unit has distributed the first
compendium of measures prepared by a working group-a com-
pendium of investment provisions in agreements entered into by
FTAA participants. Recommendations by "shadow working
groups" of prominent private sector individuals, organized by the
North-South Center of the University of Miami, were circulated
to the working groups as a series of working papers.
Particularly noteworthy is the formation of the BNHI, com-
prising approximately seventy subregional and national business
organizations. This group has held two general assemblies;
during both meetings there were fruitful discussions of the best
ways for the private sector to provide useful input and feedback
during the process. The current consensus is that the should
allow for the dissemination of information being developed by
the FTAA process to its member organizations, who would, in
turn, serve as private sector sounding boards. Their views would
be disseminated during the official FTAA process and should be
instrumental in mobilizing support for hemispheric free trade.
However, recommendations on specific issues should be devel-
oped by national groups, with no attempt to develop consensus
on all but the most general issues.
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Despite this progress, there have been some serious flaws in
the liaison with the private sector. The major problem has been
the secrecy of the HWGs. The private sector has been left in the
dark about the specifics of identification of barriers to the flow of
goods, services, and investment in the hemisphere. This is sur-
prising, as businesspeople are those most aware of barriers-
they confront them daily in their business operations. Although
instructed to disseminate the results of most of the preparatory
materials they had prepared, the HWGs have still not released
them. Thus, business groups who would like to make specific
suggestions at the next Americas Business Forum do not have
access to the solid information necessary for making informed
recommendations. Although much of the information collected
will be released eventually, the failure to do so in a timely man-
ner has deprived businesses of information they could be using
today to develop meaningful private sector input.
The current system lacks any uniform approach to the pri-
vate sector's participation. There could be one working group or
special liaison committee assigned to develop mechanisms to as-
sure the closest liaison with the private sector. Rather than rely-
ing on each working group or the tripartite organizations to de-
cide the timing and content of what is released with little
interest in what is needed for business, this special liaison
group/committee should develop recommendations for an effi-
cient flow of information both from the working groups to busi-
ness and from business to the working groups. The liaison group
should prepare a general format for the release of information to
assure some type of uniformity among the groups. Finally, the
liaison group should work closely with the organizers of the
business forums to make sure that timely information, briefings,
seminars, and technical advice are being made available to par-
ticipants. However, this proposed special liaison group needs to
be a facilitator of information exchange and should not interpose
itself between FTAA organs and private sector groupings.
The vice ministers themselves should work closely with the
chairs of each of the HWGs to assure that information is made
available well in advance of the San Jos6 meetings to allow
meaningful input. A useful suggestion is to make available on
the Trade Unit's World Wide Web page summaries and actual
contents of the compendia and data collected by the working
groups, even if these are not one hundred percent complete or
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approved. While considerable progress has been made toward
private sector involvement in the process leading to negotiation
of an FTAA, instituting the above recommendations would not
only enhance private sector involvement and quality of input for
the next few years, but also strengthen and make more viable
the final FTAA.
